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In a period when many voices are heard decrying the retention
and enforcement of criminal sanctions against so-called victimless
crimes' and over-extension of the criminal law into areas believed
to be the individual's private concern, 2 the Wisconsin Legislature
has removed one of the least effective classes of prosecution from
the state's criminal justice system. This was done during the 1973
legislative session by passage of the Alcoholism and Intoxication
Treatment Act,3 which eliminates from the statutes the crime of
public intoxication and substitutes a program aimed at providing
treatment and rehabilitation to chronic inebriates. It is the intent
of this article to examine portions of this Act in the context of the
problem which it was designed to ameliorate. Hopefully, such an
examination will prove to be of use to judges, attorneys, and others
called upon to implement its provisions throughout the state.
PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The procedure of arresting and incarcerating persons under
public drunkenness statutes has for years been a massive drain
upon the resources of the criminal justice system in the United
States. Each year some two million arrests for public drunkenness
occur in this country,4 which represent more than one-third of the
total non-traffic arrests made,5 causing a tremendous drain on the
resources of police departments. As staggering as this figure is, it
must also be presumed that a large number of persons contacted
by police who could theoretically be charged with the crime are,
for various reasons, neither arrested nor charged. One can only
speculate as to the number of arrests which extremely rigid en-
*B.A. 1971, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1974, Marquette University Law School;
practicing with the Robb Law Offices, Richland Center, Wisconsin. Mr. Robb was chief
draftsman of the Alcoholic Treatment Act for the Wisconsin Council on Criminal Justice.
1. See E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS (1965).
2. See KADISH, The Crisis of Over-Criminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1957).
3. Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198.
4. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DRUNKENNESS
REPORT].
5. Id. at 1.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
forcement might produce, and shudder at the effects of such policy
upon an already overburdened court system.
Closer examination of available data on drunkenness arrests
leads to the discovery of several tendencies common to the enforce-
ment of drunkenness statutes. It appears that the majority of drun-
kenness arrests involve men of the lowest economic classes, the
group broadly known as skid row derelicts.' In most jurisdictions,
upper and middle class inebriates are either ignored by police or
transported home by them.7 The skid row dweller, usually lacking
a real home, is arrested.' Once in custody, such persons are sub-
jected to an assembly line dispensation of justice, in which due
process of law is largely abandoned in the interest of rapid process-
ing It is not uncommon to have twenty-five or thirty defendants
brought before a judge at one time, with disposition made of the
entire group as a unit rather than on an individual basis.
The result of such procedures is a process which has come to
be known as the "revolving door."" An individual is arrested for
drunkenness, brought before a judge, usually jailed, and then re-
leased. According to the revolving door theory, the individual who
is already disadvantaged in terms of economic and social situations
finds coping with society even more difficult as a result of the
experience, becomes more dependent upon alcohol, and is more
likely to be arrested in the future. Persons who are caught in this
revolving door are often brought through the criminal justice sys-
tem an almost incredible number of times in their lives. Parties to
three recent federal court cases typify the experiences of many
chronic drinkers: Joe Driver of North Carolina was arrested for
drunkenness 200 times in 35 years, and spent two-thirds of his life
incarcerated on such charges;" Leroy Powell of Texas was arrested
100 times in 20 years for the same offense; 2 and DeWitt Easter of
the District of Columbia was arrested 70 times in 30 years for the
offense, 12 times in 1963 alone.' 3
6. R. NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECESSARY ARRESTS 1 (1971); F. GRAD, A.
GOLDBERG & B. SHAPIRO, ALCOHOLISM AND THE LAW 12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
GRAD]; DRUNKENNESS REPORT at 1.
7. DRUNKENNESS REPORT at 2; GRAD at 12.
8. DRUNKENNESS REPORT at 2; GRAD at 5.
9. GRAD at 2.
10. See generally, D. PITTMAN & C. GORDON, REVOLVING DOOR: A STUDY OF THE
CHRONIC POLICE CASE INEBRIATE (1958).
11. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 763 (4th Cir. 1966).
12. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 555 (1968).
13. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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One of the most commonly stated rationales favoring the pro-
cedure of arresting inebriates is that the removal of such individu-
als from the street provides them with protection from attack and
from the elements. 4 In a very broad sense this is true. However,
the fact is that services rendered in jail facilities are typically poor.
Serious injury and death, particularly of persons in delirium tre-
mens, are not uncommon, and medical treatment is seldom readily
available. '5
When the procedure is viewed in light of the traditionally-stated
functions of the criminal - incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilita-
tion and retribution - it becomes apparent that as the mechanism
usually operates none of these functions is accomplished. To be
certain, the individual is temporarily incapacitated in that he can-
not drink while in jail, but the period of his incarceration is almost
always brief. The high rate of recidivism demonstrates that deter-
rence is not often achieved; 8 indeed, the revolving door theory
suggests that the experience tends to reinforce a need to commit
the act again. The jail experience per se rarely if ever accomplishes
the rehabilitation of a chronic inebriate or alcoholic,17 and is likely
to have the opposite effect. When alcoholism and chronic inebria-
tion are viewed in the context of disease rather than as premedi-
tated antisocial acts, the vindictiveness of societal retribution be-
comes apparent as well as the "ineffectiveness"'" of such punish-
ment.
One further rationale presented for the existence and use of the
14. R. NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECESSARY ARRESTS 3 (1971).
15. Id.; GRAD at 12.
16. See notes 11-13, supra, and accompanying text.
17. While jail per se does not offer much in the way of rehabilitation, the threat of jail
has been used by some courts in Wisconsin as a means of coercing convicted drunks to
"voluntarily" commit themselves for treatment at such places as Winnebago State Hospital.
Certainly such commitments represent positive thinking on the part of these courts, and
undoubtedly furnish rehabilitative assistance. However, such procedures are hit-and-miss,
and in many cases are not implemented early enough to provide the optimum opportunity
for aiding the subject individual.
18. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the argument was made before the United
States Supreme Court that a chronic alcoholic who was convicted of public drunkenness
was acting not of his own volition when he became intoxicated, and that to punish him for
such conduct violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. The Court declined to accept this proposition, stating that to accept it would perforce
lead to the creation of a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility, which would
freeze the interaction between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold. Id. at
536-7. The fact remains, however, that merely because such punishment is not cruel and




criminal sanction is that the presence of intoxicated persons at
liberty on the streets poses a danger to the public. Available statist-
ical data is inconclusive, although there is data which shows that
crimes against the person frequently are accompanied by intoxica-
tion of one or both parties to the crime. 9 However, it is also
pointed out that the socio-economic groups which produce most
assaultive or homicidal felons also have a high incidence of intoxi-
cation and alcoholism.20 As is often the case with statistical argu-
mentation, a considerable amount of pro and con data juggling is
possible on this point, but it is apparent that no clear cause and
effect relationship has been established to date.
Thus, serious questions are posed concerning the usefulness of
arresting inebriates. At least one commentator, after reviewing the
situation, has suggested that the real basis for the use of the proce-
dure is twofold: (1) esthetic considerations, stemming from the fact
that society does not care to see skid row drunks on the streets,
and (2) a moral statement of the stigma attached to drunkenness. 21
A more pragmatic statement is that of Mr. Justice Marshall in
Powell v. Texas:
[F]acilities for the attempted treatment of indigent alcoholics are
woefully lacking throughout the country. It would be tragic to
return large numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and fre-
quently unsanitary inebriates to the streets of our cities without
even the opportunity to sober up adequately which a brief jail
term provides. 21
Regardless of the rationale which one cares to assign for the exist-
ence of the process, it is abundantly clear that little or no long-term
good is accomplished by its retention, and urgent need for a viable
alternative exists.
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF INEBRIATES
In addition to criminal sanctions, most states have provisions
in their codes for the civil commitment of inebriates and/or alco-
holics. Often these provisions are part of the mental health act of
the particular state, as was the case with section 51.09 of the Wis-
consin Statutes. 23 Viewed as a group, such provisions are typically
19. DRUNKENNESS REPORT at 40-42.
20. GRAD at 2; DRUNKENNESS REPORT at 43.
21. GRAD at 4.
22. 392 U.S. 514, 528 (1968).
23. Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 10 eliminates the use of § 51.09 procedures for the
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vague and ambiguous, and for this reason their constitutionality is
suspect.24 A look at the procedure under section 5 1.0925 exemplifies
this point:
Section 51.09(1) Hearing. (a) If it appears to any court of record,
by an application of three reputable adult residents of the county,
that a resident of the county or person temporarily residing
therein is an inebriate or addicted to the use of a controlled
substance under ch. 161 and in need of confinement or treatment,
the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the application,
on reasonable personal notice to the person in question, requiring
him to appear at the hearing, and shall summarily hear the evi-
dence. The court may cause notice to be given to such other
persons as it deems advisable. The court may, by attachment for
the person, require the sheriff or other police officer to take the
alleged inebriate or drug addict into custody, detain him pending
the hearing (but not to exceed 3 days) and bring him before the
court at the hearing. The court may require notice to be given
to known relatives of the person.
(b) At such hearing if the court finds that such person is an
inebriate or addicted to the use of a controlled substance under
ch. 161, and requires confinement or treatment, or that it is
necessary for the protection of himself or the public or his rela-
tives that he be committed, he may be committed...
(2) Commitment. The commitment of an inebriate or a
drug addict shall be for such period of time as in the judgment
of the superintendent of the institution may be necessary to ena-
ble him to take care of himself. He shall be released upon the
certificate of the superintendent that he has so recovered. When
he has been confined 6 months and has been refused such a
certificate he may obtain a hearing upon the question of his
recovery in the manner and with the effect provided for a re-
examination under section 51.11.
The validity of section 51.09 has never been challenged in the
courts, although even a cursory examination of its provisions re-
veals the potential for serious attack on due process grounds. For
example, objection might be made to the failure of the statute to
require the proofs to meet any specific standard, its failure to
provide for trial by jury, its failure to provide specifically for cross-
examination, its failure to provide a meaningful right to counsel,
commitment of inebriates. The provisions are retained for commitment of persons addicted
to controlled substances under Wis. STATS. ch. 161 (1971).
24. GRAD at 73.
25. Wis. STATS. § 51.09 (1971).
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and the indefinite duration of commitment which the statute al-
lows. Yet, during the year ending June 30, 1972, 442 persons were
involuntarily committed to state and county institutions as alcohol-
ics under section 51.09, a considerable increase in number of com-
mitments over any of the seven previous years. 6
Despite the weaknesses in the inebriate civil commitment stat-
ute, its treatment-oriented approach is clearly preferable to crimi-
nal prosecution. However, the civil commitment procedure was not
designed to meet the needs of the individual contacted on the street
in a helplessly inebriated condition. Even assuming, arguendo, that
the drunkenness arrest was a satisfactory means of providing im-
mediate services to the inebriate, there was no interrelationship
between the criminal arrest and civil commitment procedures
(except where a judge gave the option of "voluntary" self-
commitment or jail to an arrestee). The need existed for an over-
haul of the entire system, which would integrate procedures from
the time of street contact through to involuntary commitment, if
the latter proved necessary (including voluntary commitment).
This was the objective sought to be accomplished by the Alcohol-
ism and Intoxication Treatment Act.
SOURCES OF THE WISCONSIN ACT
It was immediately clear to the planners of the Act that any
proposed program should begin with the elimination of the crimi-
nal sanction, and then provide satisfactory alternatives to the ar-
rest procedure. Such alternatives must include making available
facilities for treatment as well as procedures for bringing the indi-
vidual into contact, at the same time giving full protection to his
rights. Eliminating the criminal sanction was simple enough; 7 es-
tablishing the alternatives, predictably, proved more difficult.
To aid in the task, the draftsmen had recourse to a piece of
model legislation, the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication
26. Total Alcoholic Commitments to State and County Institutions 1965-1972*
(Voluntary Admissions Excluded)
1965 -217 1969 -314
1966 -277 1970 -268
1967 -247 1971 -277
1968 -312 1972- 442
*Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services - Statistical Report - Basis for
Admission of Patients Admitted to Wisconsin State and County Mental Institutions. Each
figure represents statistics for the year ending June 30 of the indicated year.
27. Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 32 repeals Wis. STAT. § 947.03 (1971).
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Treatment Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. The Uniform Act, however,
merely served as a starting point for the draftsmen. Virtually every
provision of the Uniform Act was modified to some degree before
the bill was introduced. The sections most extensively changed
were those dealing with procedural mechanisms for securing treat-
ment - emergency medical care, emergency commitment, and
involuntary commitment - for intoxicated persons and alcoholics.
It was decided at the drafting stage that, rather than adopt the
procedures suggested by the Commissioners, the Wisconsin Act
should adopt the guidelines for due process in civil commitment
actions laid down by the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Wisconsin in Lessard v. Schmidt.28 Lessard was a
class action which challenged the constitutionality of Wisconsin's
mechanism for the civil commitment of alleged mentally ill, men-
tally infirm, or mentally deficient persons. The decision of the
three-judge panel held certain provisions of chapter 51 unconstitu-
tional as violative of due process and equal protection of the law. 9
The statutory provisions considered in Lessard were not the same
as the inebriate commitment provisions, but in fact appeared to be
more protective of the rights of the individual sought to be commit-
ted than did the inebriate provisions. 3 Therefore, Lessard had
reinforced the doubts about the constitutionality of Wisconsin's
existing inebriate commitment procedures as well as the mental
commitment procedures, a problem which should not be allowed
to carry over into new legislation.
FORMAT AND POLICY OF THE ACT
The Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act appears in the
form of a newly created statutory section, section 51.45. The sec-
tion is composed of eighteen subsections, which can be roughly
28. 349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), Vacated and remanded sub nom Schmidt v.
Lessard, 414 U.S. 472 (1974). The opinion on the vacation and remand dealt entirely with
procedure, and included no discussion of the merits of the case.
29. The provisions in question are found in Wis. STATS. §§ 51.02, .03, .04 (1971). For
an excellent discussion of the case, see M. Remington, Lessard v. Schmidt and its Implica-
tions for Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wisconsin, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 65 (1973).
30. For example, WIs. STAT. § 51.01(2) (1971) provides for examination of the patient
sought to be committed by two duly licensed physicians; Wis. STAT. § 51.02(2) provides that
any party in interest may examine the physicians and any other witnesses and may present
evidence; WIs. STAT. § 51.02(4) provides for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
the patient; and Wis. STAT. § 51.03 provides for trial by jury upon demand of the patient
or by a relative or friend in his behalf. Wis. STAT. § 51.09 (1971), the former inebriate and
drug addict commitment law, provides for none of these safeguards.
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divided by subject matter into administrative provisions and sub-
stantive/procedural provisions. The nine subsections containing
the administrative provisions3' delineate the powers and responsi-
bilities of the Department of Health and Social Services in plan-
ning, establishing, and maintaining treatment programs, gathering
and disseminating data, and enforcing standards and rules for
those providing and receiving treatment. Since the scope of this
article is limited to the substantive and procedural aspects of the
Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, further, in-depth dis-
cussion of the Act's administrative aspects will be dispensed with.
The remaining subsections are substantive/procedural in na-
ture, and will be examined in detail for the balance of this article.
Section 51.45(1) declares the policy of the State of Wisconsin
under the Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act to be as
follows:
It is the policy of this state that alcoholics and intoxicated
persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution because of
their consumption of alcoholic beverages but rather should be
afforded a continuum of treatment in order that they may lead
normal lives as productive members of society.
This policy statement reflects the recognition that the criminal
justice system is largely ineffectual in dealing with the problem of
public intoxication and the often-coexisting problem of alcoholism.
The President's Task Force Reports stated that "[W]hat the sys-
tem usually does accomplish is to remove the drunk from public
view, detoxify him and provide him with food, shelter, emergency
medical service, and a brief period of sobriety. ' 32 In Wisconsin,
it is felt that this much and more can be accomplished outside the
criminal justice system. Rather than continue to foster the "revolv-
ing door" syndrome, by dispensing with criminal prosecution alto-
gether and changing to a policy of providing treatment, a positive
step is taken toward returning intoxicants and alcoholics to a use-
ful, productive status in society.
31. The subsections of § 51.45, created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19, which are
administrative in nature are the following: § (3) POWERS OF DEPARTMENT; § (4) DUTIES OF
DEPARTMENT; § (6) CrTZENS ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM; § (7) COMPREHENSIVE
PROGRAM FOR TREATMENT; § (8) STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TREATMENT
FACILITIES; ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES; § (9) ACCEPTANCE FOR TREATMENT; RULES;
§ (14) RECORDS OF ALCOHOLICS AND INTOXICATED PERSONS; § (15) VISITATION AND COM-
MUNICATION TO PATIENTS; and § (16) PAYMENT FOR TREATMENT.
32. DRUNKENNESS REPORT at 3.
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DEFINITIONS UNDER THE WISCONSIN ACT
As a first step in utilizing the Act, examination should be made
of certain of the definitions provided therein in order to recognize
what conditions must be present to bring an individual under the
Act's influence.
1. Alcoholic
'Alcoholic' means a person who habitually lacks self-control
as to the use of alcoholic beverages and uses alcoholic beverages
to the extent that his health is substantially impaired or endan-
gered and by reason of such use is deprived of his ability to
support or care for himself or his family.3
The intent of this definition is to delineate a narrow group of
persons who will be subject to possible involuntary commitment as
alcoholics.34 The definition includes three elements which must be
present before involuntary commitment may be sought. First, the
person must habitually lack self-control as to the use of alcoholic
beverages. The requirement of habitualness is designed to remove
the individual who occasionally gets drunk and then returns to his
normal pattern of life from the possibility of involuntarily being
committed. This is desired for two reasons: (1) such an individual
may not suffer from a treatable alcoholism problem, and (2) a
rather large percentage of the population could be reached under
a definition broad enough to include the occasional drunk.
As the second element, the person must use alcoholic beverages
to the extent that his health is substantially impaired or endan-
gered. This requirement makes medical evidence a practical ne-
cessity in an action for involuntary commitment, particularly in
light of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to commit. Spurious commitment actions should be mini-
mized by the impracticability involved in commencing an action
without already securing a solid medical opinion of the hazard
posed to the health of the person sought to be committed.
Third, by reason of such use of alcoholic beverages, the person
must be deprived of his ability to support himself or his family. The
State of Wisconsin has a compelling interest in the support of its
residents, and is empowered to take steps toward providing such
support. When one habitually lacks self-control as to the use of
alcoholic beverages and uses them to the extent that his health is
33. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(2)(a), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
34. The procedure for involuntary commitment is found in Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13),
created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
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substantially impaired or endangered, it can be argued that he is
hurting only himself and that he has an ultimate right to do so.
However, when he is by reason of such use deprived of his ability
to support himself or his family, it is probable that such persons
will become wards of the state. Thus the state may act to remedy
or forestall such a situation.
2. Incapacitated by Alcohol
'Incapacitated by alcohol' means that a person, as a result of
the use of alcohol, is unconscious or has his judgment otherwise
so impaired that he is incapable of realizing and making a ra-
tional decision with respect to his need for treatment, as evi-
denced objectively by extreme physical debilitation, physical
harm or threats of harm to himself or to any other person, or to
property."
This definition is used to delineate those persons who, at the
time contact is made, are suffering recognizable impairment of
their functions as a result of the use of alcohol, and who thus are
candidates for emergency medical treatment or emergency com-
mitment." Contemplated under its terms are persons encountered
sleeping on a doorstep, staggering about in traffic on a busy street,
or in similar circumstances. A person will not be subject to full-
scale involuntary commitment by reason of his being "incapaci-
tated by alcohol;" the person who suffers from a long-term alco-
holic degeneration, while he may initially be contacted while inca-
pacitated, may be committed only if found to be an "alcoholic."
The design of the objective evidence criteria is to make it un-
necessary for a law enforcement officer to attempt a determination
of the person's capability of making a rational decision as to his
need for treatment. The presence of extreme physical debilitation,
physical harm or threats of harm to himself or to any other person
or to property, apparently resulting from the use of alcohol, is
sufficient to bring the individual under the definition and thus a
proper candidate for emergency treatment.
3. Intoxicated Person
'Intoxicated person' means a person whose mental or physi-
cal functioning is substantially impaired as a result of the use of
alcohol."
35. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(2)(d), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
36. Emergency medical treatment provisions are found in Wis. STAT. 51.45(1 1), and
emergency commitment is provided for by WIs. STAT. 51.45 (12), both created by Wis. Laws
1973, ch. 198 § 19.
37. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(2)(f), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
[Vol. 58
REVISION OF ALCOHOLISM LAW
This is the broadest of the three definitions in the Act pertain-
ing to persons who use alcohol. It is used as a sole criterion only
in the case of a person who voluntarily seeks emergency treat-
ment3s or who, in a public place and appearing to be in need of
help, consents to be taken to an emergency treatment center.3 9
Persons in this broad class are not subject to even brief involuntary
custody, except where there is likelihood of future harm to others."
In the latter event, the machinery of due process of law is brought
into play for the person whose threat of harm causes him to be
detained without his consent.4
VOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLICS
An alcoholic may apply for voluntary treatment directly to
an approved public treatment facility. . . . For purposes of this
subsection, an 'alcoholic' is a person who habitually lacks self-
control as to the use of alcoholic beverages, or uses such bever-
ages to the extent that his health is substantially impaired or
endangered or his social or economic function is substantially
disrupted.42
The intent of this voluntary treatment provision is to provide
services for the alcoholic who recognizes that he has a drinking
problem and wishes to take steps to control or cure his problem.
This provision is unlike previous statutes of its kind (such as old
section 51.09) in that emphasis is placed on voluntary treatment
rather than upon commitment. Experience indicates that persons
having alcohol-related problems will take advantage of voluntary
treatment, particularly if the facilities are conveniently located.43
For purposes of the voluntary treatment provisions, an ex-
tremely broad definition of "alcoholic" is used. The reason for this
is to make such voluntary treatment available to as wide a segment
of the public as might care to take advantage of such services. (It
is perhaps unfortunate that the same term is used to describe this
broad class of people as was used to delineate the narrow group
of persons who might be subject to involuntary commitment, even
though the voluntary treatment provision and the original, involun-
38. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(11)(a), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
39. Id.
40. Involuntary custody in the event of possible future harm to others is authorized by
Wis. STAT. § 51.45(12), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
41. Id.
42. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(10)(a), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
43. R. NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECESSARY ARRESTS 151 (1971); GRAD at 48-55.
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tary commitment definition each point out the limitations upon
their respective usages of the term.)"
Other aspects of the voluntary treatment provisions are kept
flexible in order to allow treatment to be fitted to the individual's
wants and needs to the highest degree possible. The superintendent
in charge of an approved public treatment facility is vested with
the discretion to admit a person for treatment, deny him admit-
tance, or refer him to another approved public treatment facility
better able to assist him.45 A patient admitted for treatment does
not obligate himself for any specific period of time nor until he has
reached any specific level of recovery; the patient may leave the
facility at any time." In the event that the patient does choose to
leave, while appearing to still be in need of help, out-patient treat-
ment, intermediate treatment, and supportive services will be avail-
able.47
EMERGENCY TREATMENT FOR INTOXICATED PERSONS OR PERSONS
INCAPACITATED BY ALCOHOL
An intoxicated person may come voluntarily to an approved
public treatment facility for emergency treatment. A person who
appears to be intoxicated in a public place and to be in need of
help, if he consents to the proffered help, may be assisted to his
home, an approved public treatment facility, or approved private
treatment facility, or other health facility by any law enforce-
ment officer.
A person who appears to be incapacitated by alcohol shall be
taken into protective custody by a law enforcement officer and
forthwith brought to an approved public treatment facility for
emergency treatment. If no approved public treatment facility is
readily available he shall be taken to an emergency medical serv-
ice customarily used for incapacitated persons. The law enforce-
ment officer, in detaining the person and in taking him to an
approved public treatment facility, is taking him into protective
custody and shall make every reasonable effort to protect his
health and safety. In taking the person into protective custody,
the detaining officer may take reasonable steps to protect him-
self. A taking into protective custody under this section is not an
arrest. No entry or other record shall be made to indicate that
the person has been arrested or charged with a crime."
44. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(2)(a), (10)(a), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
45. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(10)(b), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
46. WIS. STAT. § 51.45(10)(c), (d), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
47. Id. § 51.45(10)(c).
48. Wis. STAT. §§ 51.45(l 1)(a), (b), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
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This subsection contemplates the provision of care to persons
who are contacted when in an intoxicated condition or when inca-
pacitated by alcohol. This is a point at which the Act makes a
major departure from prior law, for under prior law it was at this
point that the law enforcement officer was faced with deciding
whether to arrest the individual, take him home, or ignore him.
Under the Act, the option of arrest (for mere public intoxication)
is no longer available to the officer. If the individual appears to be
intoxicated in a public place and in need of help, he must consent
to be helped before the officer can act. If the individual appears to
be incapacitated by alcohol, he shall be taken into protective cus-
tody and removed to a facility for emergency treatment, which
may be either a detoxification center with medical staff available
or an emergency hospital-type facility.
In the case of the individual apparently incapacitated by alco-
hol, much emphasis is placed upon guidelines for the protective
custody to which he is subject. Every reasonable effort must be
made to protect his health and safety. No entry or other record
shall be made to indicate that the person has been arrested or
charged with a crime. At the same time, the Act recognizes that
the law enforcement officers who will be called upon to enforce the
custody provision may, upon occasion, have difficulty in dealing
with persons who are incapacitated by alcohol whom they take into
custody. Express provision is made for the right of the officer to
take reasonable steps to protect himself. To do otherwise would
place an intolerable burden upon law enforcement personnel, and
might result in a tacit refusal on their part to implement this
procedure. A provision which bars criminal or civil liability for
false imprisonment by an officer acting in compliance with section
51.45 is designed to serve the same purpose.49
Other portions of this subsection deal with procedures to be
followed at the approved public treatment facility. In keeping with
the emergency assistance nature of the services provided here-
under, the person brought to the facility must be examined by a
licensed physician as soon as possible." This examination is used
to determine the person's physical condition, particularly where
there is a possibility that he has suffered injury, which information
serves both as a diagnostic device and as a means of avoiding
possible liability of the facility. Assuming that no reason is found
49. Wis. STAT. § 51,45(11)(g), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
50. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(1l)(c), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
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for admitting the person to the facility as a patient, he may be
taken to his home, or to another place of shelter if he has no
home.51
The case of the person incapacitated by alcohol is treated more
carefully. Such a person, it will be recalled, is unconscious or has
his judgment so impaired as to be irrational. Once such a person
is no longer incapacitated by alcohol, his release is mandatory.
If such a person remains incapacitated by alcohol for more than
24 hours, application must be made for an emergency commit-
ment.5 3 In addition to the latter safeguard, an additional protec-
tion of the individual lies in the requirement that his family or next
of kin be notified as soon as possible after admission (unless the
individual is an adult, is not incapacitated, and requests that there
be no notification).54
EMERGENCY COMMITMENT
An intoxicated person who has threatened, attempted or in-
flicted physical harm on another and is likely to inflict physical
harm on another unless committed, or is incapacitated by alco-
hol, may be committed to the state and brought to an approved
public treatment facility for emergency treatment. A refusal to
undergo treatment does not constitute evidence of lack of judg-
ment as to the need for treatment. 5
Emergency commitment, distinct from the emergency treat-
ment discussed in the previous section of this article, is a procedure
designed for use in the case of an individual who poses a danger
to others or who may be endangered himself due to extreme im-
pairment of his physical functioning by reason of his use of alcohol.
As a practical matter, this procedure will probably be used in
relatively few cases, since the number of persons who pose a physi-
cal threat or who remain incapacitated by alcohol for an extended
period of time will be small. It is anticipated that the large majority
of persons will receive sufficient treatment at the emergency treat-
ment (detoxification) stage to enable their return home or to wher-
ever they might wish to go.
Nevertheless, cases will doubtless arise wherein the short-term
emergency treatment will prove inadequate to sufficiently restore
51. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(11)(e), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
52. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(11)(d), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
53. Id.
54. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(l1)(f), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
55. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(12)(a), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
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the individual to competence within the permissible period of de-
tention, or where an alcoholic whose commitment is sought under
involuntary commitment provisions is intoxicated and dangerous
to others or incapacitated by alcohol. It is in these "in-between"
cases that the emergency commitment provisions are designed to
apply.
Applications for emergency commitment under this subsection
can be made by a number of persons. The physician, spouse, guard-
ian, or a relative of the person56 are all in positions to be familiar
with the individual and to have cognizance of his drinking problem.
An additional class of other responsible persons may also make
application. 7 In most cases one of the first four mentioned will
make the application, but there are conceivable instances where no
such person exists or is aware of conditions. Thus a clergyman,
counselor, or other person with cognizance could initiate the pro-
ceedings.
Each application is required to state facts to support the need
for such emergency commitment, and to be accompanied by one
or more affidavits which aver with particularity the factual basis
for the allegations contained in the petition." These requirements
are designed to act as an initial safeguard of the rights of the
subject individual. Not only must the stated facts provide a proper
basis for emergency commitment, but in light of sanctions avail-
able against false swearing, the affiant should feel constrained to
be certain that such facts are not overstated nor colored in any
way. The original text of the Uniform Act required that the appli-
cation be accompanied by a physician's certificate in lieu of the
factual affidavit. This requirement was modified in the Wisconsin
Act for two reasons: (1) the affidavit combined with the early
preliminary hearing59 is sufficient to determine the obvious validity
or invalidity of the application without infringing upon the person's
constitutional rights, and (2) Lessard v. Schmidt demands that the
privilege against self-incrimination be applied to statements made
to physicians."0 Thus the testimony of the certifying physician
could be tainted at the hearing stage, hampering the fact-finding
process.
When an individual is committed without his consent to an
56. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(12)(b), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(12)(d), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
60. 349 F. Supp. at 1101-2.
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
approved public treatment facility, he is in a situation where due
process of law must be observed for the protection of his rights.
The Lessard v. Schmidt court held that a person sought to be
involuntarily detained on grounds of mental illness has a right to
counsel, and to appointed counsel if the person is indigent." This
right is protected in the Act by the requirement that the person
sought to be committed under this subsection be advised, upon
arrival at the facility, of his right to counsel, both orally and in
writing.62 At the same time he must be advised of his right to trial
by jury, his privilege against self-incrimination, and of the reasons
for his detention and the standard under which he may be commit-
ted prior to all interviews with physicians, psychologists, or other
personnel.13 Notification of these rights were also deemed requi-
site to due process of law by the Lessard court, 4 although by
requiring the notice to be given before every interview, the Act
appears to surpass the Lessard decision in diligence.
Mere notification of rights, however, with no readily available
means of implementing such rights, is of questionable value. An
individual who wishes to contest a commitment needs the assis-
tance of adversary counsel from the outset of the detention. For
this reason, this subsection of the Act requires that counsel be
made available immediately to every person committed under it.
The right to counsel can be waived if the person so desires, al-
though the incidence of competent, knowledgable waivers should
be low. If the person does not have his own attorney, an official
of the approved public treatment facility to which the person has
been brought shall apply to a court commissioner or county court
for the appointment of counsel, whose services shall be provided if
the person is indigent.65 The purpose for this provision is two-fold.
First, in the rare case where there is no valid basis for holding the
person in the facility, counsel will be immediately available to
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Second, Lessard v. Schmidt
places very stringent time limits upon the period that a person may
be held without preliminary hearing. This period is limited to forty-
eight hours," so it is vital that no time be wasted in securing
61. 349 F. Supp. at 1097.
62. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(12)(c), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
63. Id.
64. Trial by jury is discussed at 349 F. Supp. 1092; notice of the privilege against self-
incrimination is discussed at 349 F. Supp. 1090-2.
65. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(12)(d), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
66. 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
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counsel. The amount of time for preparation available to counsel,
limited as it is, must be protected as much as possible, and every
possible effort is required to get him into the case without delay.
Thus the application for appointment of counsel must not be de-
layed beyond twenty-four hours after arrival at the facility. 7 The
time for the preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for
the need to commit will also be set at the appearance to appoint
counsel. In the event that there is no need to appoint counsel, the
twenty-four hour limit remains in effect for an appearance to set
the preliminary hearing.68 (The preliminary hearing procedure will
be considered in more depth in the discussion of involuntary com-
mitment.)
The superintendent in charge of the approved public treatment
facility has the authority to refuse an application for emergency
commitment if in his opinion the application and supporting affi-
davits are insufficient to sustain the grounds for commitment.69
Generally this authority will not be exercised, since the decision on
a close question can be deferred for a maximum of forty-eight
hours until the hearing on probable cause. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant that such a person have the authority, for in the event of a
plainly unsupported or unsupportable application, any detention
whatsoever is improper.
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
A person may be committed to the custody of the state by
the county court upon the petition of his spouse or guardian, a
relative, a physician, or the superintendent of any approved pub-
lic treatment facility. A refusal to undergo treatment shall not
constitute evidence of lack of judgment as to the need for treat-
ment. The petition for commitment shall:
1. Allege that the person is an alcoholic as defined in
subsection (2)(a); and
2. Allege that the condition of the person as an alcoholic is
evidenced by a pattern of conduct which is dangerous to the
person or to others; and
3. Be supported by one or more affidavits which aver with
particularity the factual basis for the allegations contained in the
petition .71
67. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(12)(d), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
68. Id.
69. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(12)(e), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
70. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(a), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
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An action for involuntary commitment is commenced by peti-
tion supported by affidavit, just as in the emergency commitment
procedure. However, the class of persons denominated "other re-
sponsible persons," who may petition for emergency commit-
ment,7' are not eligible petitioners for involuntary commitment.
The individual who has no spouse, guardian, relative, nor physician
may be committed upon the petition of the superintendent in
charge of any approved public treatment facility, who is in fact the
next most likely person to be acquainted with such an individual's
drinking problem.
Whenever a person sought to be committed is in custody, or is
taken into custody after the filing of the petition, a preliminary
hearing is required to be held within forty-eight hours of initial
detention.7 2 In addition to this time limitation, a series of stringent
requirements, derived from the Lessard case, which must be ful-
filled at the preliminary hearing are laid out in the statute.7 3
The person sought to be committed must be represented by
counsel (unless knowingly waived, with consent of the judge), and
shall have counsel provided if he is indigent. Counsel shall have
access to all reports, records, and transcripts of interviews made
or held prior to the hearing. Effective and timely notice shall be
given the detainee and his counsel, and the detainee must be pres-
ent at the hearing and given opportunity to be heard4.7
The preliminary hearing is not required in the case of an indi-
vidual who is not in custody at the time the petition is made. In
such a case, or upon a finding of probable cause to believe that a
person is in need of commitment (at a preliminary hearing), a date
is set for a full hearing to be held not more than fourteen days from
the earlier of the petition date or initial point of detention.75 By
motion of the person whose commitment is sought and for cause,
an extension of up to fourteen more days may be had.7 At the end
of this twenty-eight day period, a full hearing on commitment must
be held. The same requirement of access to all reports, records, and
transcripts of interviews by the staff of the treatment facility ap-
plies to the period preceeding the full commitment hearing as ap-
plies to the period preceeding the preliminary.77
71. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(12)(b), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
72. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(13)(b), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
73. 349 F. Supp. at 1091-2.
74. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(b), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
75. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(13)(b), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
76. Id.
77. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(d), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
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The commitment hearing is envisioned as an open hearing (un-
less the person whose commitment is sought moves to have it
closed) where the jury or, upon waiver of jury, the court hears the
evidence." Ordinary rules of evidence are applicable (a rule de-
signed to eliminate hearsay, primarily). The presence of the indi-
vidual is required at the hearing, and he will be given opportunity
to be heard.79 The desirability of having the testimony of a physi-
cian who has examined the person sought to be committed is also
emphasized in the hearing provisions, including a procedure for
temporary five day commitment for medical examination where
the evidence suffices to demonstrate the need."
The standard of proof required for commitment is the criminal
burden, beyond a reasonable doubt.8 The use of this standard is
another of the Lessard court's requirements for the protection of
individual rights in civil commitment action." Even upon a finding
by the trier of fact that the grounds alleged in the petition have
been established beyond a reasonable doubt, however, an addi-
tional showing is required of the Department of Health and Social
Services. Before an order for commitment can issue, the depart-
ment must show: (1) that there is no suitable alternative available;
(2) that the department is able to provide the most appropriate
treatment for him; and (3) that the treatment is likely to be benefi-
cial.0
The commitment under section 51.45(13) is to the custody of
the state for a period of thirty days unless sooner discharged." At
the end of this period, discharge is automatic unless the depart-
ment, before the expiration of the period, petitions for and receives
a court order of recommitment for an additional ninety days.9
Two such ninety day recommitments are allowed, at the end of
which period discharge is automatic. Each such petition for re-
commitment reinitiates the hearing procedure as previously de-
scribed, with a ten day period of time between petition date and
hearing date and new notice to the committed individual, his coun-
78. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(e), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(0, created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
82. 349 F. Supp. at 1095.
83. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(f), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
84. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(g), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
85. Id.
86. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(h), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
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sel, next of kin, and other interested parties."
There are three means of discharge available to the person who
has been committed, in addition to possible reversal of the commit-
ment hearing upon appeal to the circuit court.8 As mentioned
earlier, discharge is automatic at the end of the period for which
the person has been committed or recommitted (210 days if the
maximum of two recommitments are made). Alternatively, the
Department of Health and Social Services may discharge a com-
mitted person if either (1) the patient is no longer an alcoholic or
the likelihood of infliction of physical harm to another no longer
exists; or (2) further treatment will not be likely to bring about
significant improvement in the person's condition, or treatment is
no longer adequate or appropriate.8 The third means of seeking
discharge is by writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 292.01(2)
of the statutes."
CONCLUSION
The Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, when viewed
in its entirety, appears to be a complex set of procedures, especially
in light of its relatively simple objective of providing treatment to
problem drinkers in lieu of arresting them. (This objective, it must
be emphasized, does not extend to the abrogation of any other
criminal sanctions against specific acts done while intoxicated, nor
is there any intent to create a doctrine of non-responsibility for
criminal acts done while intoxicated.)91 When one initially exam-
ines the procedural machinery created by the Act, two questions
might come to mind: (1) Are the complexities necessary?; and (2)
Will the procedures work?
The answer to the necessity question appears to be "yes." The
Lessard v. Schmidt decision clearly is not a mere anomaly in the
law. On the contrary, it represents a well-reasoned answer to the
question of what is required by the Constitution in terms of due
87. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(i), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
88. Appeal procedures are set forth in WIs. STAT. § 51.45(13)(r), created by Wis. Laws
1973, ch. 198 § 19.
89. WIS. STAT. § 51.45(13)(k), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
90. Wis. STAT. § 51.45(13)(n), created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 198 § 19.
91. WIs. STAT. § 51.45(18) provides that "[n]othing in this section affects any law,
ordinance or rule the violation of which is punishable by fine, forfeiture or imprisonment."
Thus it appears that a county or municipality could continue to enforce an ordinance against
public drunkenness. It is strongly suggested that the Department of Health and Social
Services incorporate into its statewide program whatever administrative sanctions they
deem appropriate to discourage the enforcement of such ordinances.
[Vol. 58
REVISION OF ALCOHOLISM LAW
process of law in civil commitment proceedings. For this reason
Lessara was relied upon heavily in the drafting of the Alcoholism
and Intoxication Treatment Act. Of course, only time will tell
whether the United States Supreme Court will hear an appeal of
Lessard on the merits, and, if so, whether that Court will modify
its holding in any way. 2 An informal consensus of opinion suggests
that little if anything would be changed from the three-judge
panel's holding upon such an appeal. Such prognostications about
a possible Lessard appeal, it must also be remembered, are purely
of academic interest with regard to the Act (barring the imposition
of even higher due process standards by the Supreme Court). The
Act is the law in Wisconsin as of its effective date, and is not
assailable in the courts for being too protective of individual rights.
Therefore, energies should be directed toward the application of
the Act in Wisconsin.
As to whether or not the machinery of the Act will be successful
in terms of application to and use by the court system of Wiscon-
sin, again only time and experience will provide the definitive an-
swer. Admittedly, at first glance the procedures appear complex,
and possible trouble areas (such as narrow time limitations) seem
to lurk throughout the Act. However, many other changes in the
law have shared this spectre (the Miranda rule, for example) and
have been fitted into the machinery of the law with no more than
ordinary amounts of oiling and adjusting. The bench and bar of
Wisconsin, who will have most of the responsibility of implement-
ing the Act, are quite capable of making the Wisconsin Alcoholism
and Intoxication Treatment Act a success.
92. Note 28. The district court decision did reach the Supreme Court, only to be vacated
and remanded without discussion on the merits. The order was held insufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(d), that an order granting injunction "be specific
in terms" and "describe in reasonable detail in the act or acts sought to be restrained."
Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 472, 475 (1974).
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